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I. Introduction
The first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (MOP 1)1 took place from 28 November to 10
December 2005 in Montreal, in conjunction with
the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 11). This meeting signifies a success-
ful start into a new era of international climate pol-
icy: The Kyoto Protocol, which in the past had been
sometimes declared as being dead,2 has become
operational, including its flexible mechanisms and
its non-compliance procedure. Negotiations have
started to move forward towards ‘Kyoto 2’, an agree-
ment for the time after 2012 when the Protocol’s
first commitment period expires.
More than 10,000 participants made this the
largest climate change conference ever, exceeding
even the previous record set by COP 3, which had
seen the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
The Canadian Environment Minister Stéphane
Dion, serving as President to the summit, termed
the challenges of the meeting the ‘Three Is’, draw-
ing on an idea by former Executive Secretary
Michael Zammit Cutajar: Implementation, Im-
provement and Innovation. The first challenge (Im-
plementation) entailed in particular the adoption of
the Marrakesh Accords, the agreements reached at
COP 7 in Marrakesh that set out the detailed rules
for making the Kyoto Protocol operational. The sec-
ond challenge (Improvement) referred to improv-
ing the work of the Framework Convention and the
Kyoto Protocol in the near future. The third and
most important challenge (Innovation) referred to
the further evolution of the regime.
This paper will provide an account of the main
developments in Montreal along the lines of the
‘Three Is’. However, due to the importance of the
issue and the supposed interest of the reader, the
politically most noted developments regarding the
post-2012 process (Innovation) are described at the
beginning of this report. It is followed by the devel-
opments regarding Implementation and Improve-
ment. The paper concludes with an assessment and
outlook on international climate policy.
II. Innovation – paving the way for
post-2012 negotiations
The reduction obligations contained in the Protocol
expire in 2012 and are rather moderate compared
to the efforts needed to prevent ‘dangerous’ climate
change, the Framework Convention’s ultimate ob-
jective. The recent years have therefore seen inten-
sive debates on the development of mitigation com-
mitments beyond the Protocol’s first commitment
period in the research community and in civil soci-
ety, but also increasingly among decision-makers.3
However, before the Montreal conference these
post-2012 discussions had not been part of the for-
mal negotiations. An early attempt by the EU to
transfer this issue onto the agenda of negotiations
failed at COP 8 in New Delhi (2002) and caused seri-
ous disturbances in the relationship between the
EU and the developing countries, organised in the
Group of 77 (G-77) & China.4 Last year at COP 10 in
Buenos Aires, long-lasting, high-level negotiations
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1 For the sake of brevity and to minimise complexity the abbrevia-
tion MOP is used instead of COP/MOP for ‘the Conference of the
Parties (to the Convention) serving as the meeting of the Parties (to
the Protocol)’. 
2 See Meinhard Doelle: The Cat Came Back, or the Nine Lives of the
Kyoto Protocol (unpublished manuscript; http://law.dal.ca/files/
the_cat_came_back_or_the_nine_lives_of_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf.
3 See, for example, http://www.wupperinst.org/COP11/index.html;
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4 See Ott, ‘Global Climate’, 13 Yearbook of International Environ-
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only resulted in an informal ‘Seminar of Govern-
mental Experts’ that was not formally linked to the
negotiation process.5
The conditions in Montreal, however, were far
more promising for getting ‘Innovation’ processes
within the climate regime started. This was, first,
due to a legal provision contained in the Protocol:
Article 3.9 requests the MOP to initiate considera-
tions on post-2012 commitments for Annex I
Parties6 at least seven years before the end of the
first commitment period, i.e. in 2005. Second, nego-
tiations under the MOP only involve the ‘like-mind-
ed’ group of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, thus
excluding the US delegation that has been a stum-
bling block in past negotiations. Thirdly, more than
ever before, private sector actors involved in the
evolving carbon markets put pressure on the Kyoto
Parties to send a clear signal on mid- and long-term
perspectives at MOP 1. Last but not least, recent
results of climate models combined with emissions
trends and projections in recent years have ren-
dered it more obvious that mitigation activities
have to be strengthened far beyond the Kyoto obli-
gations.7 The Canadian Presidency attempted to
pursue these tasks with a ‘dual track’ approach:
Apart from initiating a negotiation process under
Article 3.9 KP, President Dion also pushed for a
decision under the Climate Convention to kick-start
a process with broader participation beyond the
‘Kyoto Ratifiers’. 
1. The Kyoto track
There were mainly two points of contention during
the negotiations pursuant to Article 3.9. The first
was of a more procedural nature, involving ques-
tions of the institutional setting and the timeline
for negotiations. From the outset of the negotia-
tions, the G-77 & China, were quite clear on their
position to establish an open-ended ad hoc working
group of Kyoto Parties that should complete its
work with a view to adopt decisions on future com-
mitments at MOP 4 in 2008.8 Such an ad hoc work-
ing group has the benefit that it can meet more
often than the MOP as well as have chair and its
own agenda. This enables the group to focus solely
on the issue addressed in its mandate and to for-
mulate draft decisions for the MOP. The G-77 &
China emphasised that progress under Article 3.9
KP was seen as a crucial test of the industrialised
countries’ willingness to take the lead and of their
faith in the Protocol. The proposals put forward by
the EU and Japan in the first week were much
weaker on the procedural aspects and did not men-
tion any timeline or negotiation body.9 However,
these first proposals were partly strategic positions
to have a bargaining chip on the second point of
contention: Which countries should take on com-
mitments?
Although Article 3.9 KP only addresses future
commitments of Annex I Parties, most industri-
alised countries aimed at broadening the process to
other Parties. They proposed to include a reference
in the mandate to Article 9 KP. This article pre-
scribes a general review of the adequacy of the
Protocol at regular intervals, with the first review
starting at MOP 2. This review might be used to
also consider future actions by developing coun-
tries. The G-77 & China, however, clearly stated in
their proposal that ‘no new commitment shall be
introduced under the Protocol for Parties not in-
cluded in Annex I’ and therefore refused to include
5 Ott/Brouns/Sterk/Wittneben, ‘It Takes Two to Tango: Climate
Policy at COP 10 in Buenos Aires and Beyond’, JEEPL 2005, 
pp. 84-91.
6 Throughout this Article, Annex I Party means a country included
in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) that has ratified the UNFCCC or has
additionally ratified the Kyoto Protocol and thus has a commit-
ment inscribed in Annex B, Kyoto Protocol. These are mainly the
traditional ‘industrialised’ countries. The term non-Annex I Party
refers to a Party that either ratified the UNFCCC or both, FCCC
and Kyoto Protocol but is not included in these Annexes. These
are mainly the traditional ‘developing’ countries.
7 See, for example, UNFCCC, Key GHG Data, Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Data for 1990-2003 submitted to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn 2005; 
Den Den Elzen/Meinshausen, Meeting the EU 2°C climate tarket:
global and regional emission implications. Bilthoven: Nether-
lands Environmental Assessment Agency 2005. Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Avoiding Dangerous Cli-
mate Change, Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Green-
house Gases, 1 to 3 February 2005, Met Office, Exeter, United
Kingdom, Executive Summary of the Conference Report, and
Schellnhuber (ed.), Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2006.
8 Article 3, paragraph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol: consideration of
commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in
Annex I to the Convention, Draft decision proposed by Jamaica
on behalf of the Group of 77 and China,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/CRP.3, 2 December 2005.
9 Article 3, paragraph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol: consideration of
commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in
Annex I to the Convention Draft decision proposed by the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on behalf of the
European Community and its Member States,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/CRP.3, 2 December 2005; Article 3, para-
graph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol: consideration of commitments for
subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I to the Conven-
tion, Draft decision proposed by Japan,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/CRP.3, 2 December 2005.
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any reference to Article 9 KP. During negotiations
behind closed doors almost all industrialised coun-
tries finally accepted the G-77 & China position that
from a legal perspective Article 3.9 KP was not the
suitable place to discuss broader participation.
They subsequently aimed at a separate decision to
prepare the Article 9 review and focused more on
the second track of negotiations under the Conven-
tion to initiate a process with broader participation. 
Industrialised countries also agreed to the estab-
lishment of an ‘open-ended ad hoc working group
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol’ whereas the G-77 &
China had to give up their 2008 timeline in favour
of a less specific phrase that negotiations should be
completed ‘in time to ensure that there is no gap
between the first and the second commitment peri-
od’. This formula appears to be sufficiently precise
in order to mandate the finalisation of negotiations
before 2009, since it will take at least two years to
complete the ratification process for the new com-
mitments. Nevertheless, it took three lengthy night
sessions before Parties forwarded a draft decision
to the COP Presidency, mainly because Russia in-
sisted on including a provision to give non-Annex I
Parties the opportunity to take on voluntary com-
mitments. This was, however, not only politically
unacceptable for the G-77 & China but also legally
impossible as Article 3.9 KP explicitly refers only to
Annex I countries. The MOP finally agreed to re-
quest President Dion to hold consultations on the
Russian proposal and to report his conclusions to
MOP 2, while the decision on Article 3.9 KP was
adopted in the form already agreed on 36 hours 
earlier.10
Subsequently, the MOP agreed to include a refer-
ence to Article 9 KP in its report inviting Parties to
submit relevant information and views on the
review of the Protocol by 1 September 2006.11 The
second MOP will receive a report by the Secretariat
on these submissions. If it does not come to any
final conclusions, from next year onwards there
might thus be a third process on the future of the
climate regime, dealing with the review of the
Kyoto Protocol as a whole.
2. The Convention track
Negotiations on further commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol were complemented by an initiative
of COP President Dion to start a post-2012 process
under the Convention. The underlying motivation
for this ‘dual track’ approach was clearly visible: a
COP decision allows for broader coverage, both on
substance (also including adaptation to the impacts
of climate change and a focus on technologies and
development goals) and participation (also address-
ing Convention Parties that have not yet ratified the
Protocol). Environmental groups, however, claimed
that the Convention track was not very promising
as the US administration had announced many
times before and at the conference that ‘post-2012’
was a non-issue for them in Montreal. These con-
cerns were partly confirmed when the COP
President presented his proposal for a COP decision
on 6 December.12 It only included a series of work-
shops on a broad range of issues for long-term
cooperative action to address climate change.
Further negotiations followed but expectations
were quite low, especially after the US delegates
walked out of the negotiations on Thursday night.
Given these circumstances it came as a surprise for
many observers that negotiations on the President’s
proposal were finished even a few hours before
Parties came to an agreement on the ‘Kyoto track’.
However, the final COP decision is rather weak. It is
not even called a process but instead a ‘dialogue on
long-term cooperative action to address climate
change by enhancing implementation of the Con-
vention’.13 The Parties acknowledge that ‘the global
nature of climate change calls for the widest possi-
ble cooperation and participation in an effective
and appropriate international response’. However,
due to the insistence of the US negotiators, the deci-
sion also requires that the dialogue should not prej-
udice ‘any future negotiations, commitments, pro-
cess, framework or mandate under the Convention’
and is rather ‘an open and non-binding exchange of
views [ . . . ] and will not open to any negotiations
leading to new commitments’. Starting with a first
round of submissions by Parties due 15 April 2006,
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10 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Consideration of commitments for sub-
sequent periods for Parties included in Annex I to the Conven-
tion under Article 3, paragraph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/L.8/Rev.1, 10 December 2005.
11 See the conference report on the website of the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat: http://www.unfccc.int.
12 Draft decision on a process for discussions on long-term coope-
rative action to address climate change, Proposal by the Presi-
dent, FCCC/CP/2005/CRP.1, 6 December 2005.
13 Draft decision -/CP.11, Dialogue on long-term cooperative
action to address climate change by enhancing implementation
of the Convention, FCCC/CP/2005/L.4/Rev.1, 9 December 2005.
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the dialogue will continue until COP 13 and will
take place in up to four workshops that address
future activities in a broad range of areas including
adaptation and mitigation activities. 
Although this dialogue will not directly result in
‘long-term cooperative action’ it will, at least, pro-
vide a forum for an exchange of views and infor-
mation. Considering the starting point of negotia-
tions when two major actors, the G-77 & China and
the US, were not very keen on negotiating manda-
tory future action, this dialogue is probably the best
agreement that was possible. The ‘Seminar of Gov-
ernmental Experts’ (SOGE) in May 2005 that was
not even officially linked to the negotiating process
indicates the potential value of such a dialogue to
lead to a better understanding of each other’s posi-
tions. In the case of Papua New Guinea, it even had
a direct effect on official negotiations as the semi-
nar prepared the ground for the submission of a
proposal on avoiding deforestation in developing
countries to the COP. 
3. The Papua New Guinea proposal
This proposal by Papua New Guinea resulted in
another future oriented process that started in
Montreal and falls under the term ‘Innovation’:
Based on its SOGE presentation in May 2005, Papua
New Guinea, supported by eight other countries
from Latin America and Africa, requested the sec-
retariat to add the item ‘reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing countries: approaches
to stimulate action’ to the COP agenda. Highlight-
ing that a large share of global emissions results
from deforestation but that neither the Convention
nor the Protocol currently adequately addresses
these emissions, a joint submission by Papua New
Guinea and Costa Rica emphasised the need for
innovative approaches in this area as a major re-
quirement for achieving the objective of the Cli-
mate Convention to prevent ‘dangerous climate
change’.14 They proposed a ‘fair and equitable ac-
cess to carbon markets’ as a condition for substan-
tial engagement and made two suggestions: either
to elaborate an optional Protocol under the Climate
Convention or to make forest conservation activi-
ties eligible under the CDM. 
The COP decided to submit this issue for further
deliberations to SBSTA. It invited Parties to submit
their views on substance and recommendations on
the further process by 31 March 2006 for consider-
ation at SBSTA-24 in May 2006. It furthermore pro-
posed that a workshop take place before SBSTA-25
in November 2006.15 The issue will thus be dealt
with as part of the post-2012 package.
Accounting forest conservation activities as emis-
sion reductions is not as simple as it seems at a first
glance. Having in mind the controversial debate on
‘avoided deforestation’ in the run-up to COP 7 in
Marrakesh, there are many factors that need to be
taken into account when attempting to protect for-
est areas (e.g. property rights, permanence, moni-
toring). However, the Papua New Guinea initiative
addresses one of the major omissions in the current
design of the climate regime.
III. Implementation – completing 
the Kyoto framework and preparing 
for adaptation 
1. Adopting the Marrakesh Accords
The Kyoto Protocol as adopted in 1997 established
absolute quantitative emission limitation and re-
duction commitments for industrialised countries
as well as market mechanisms – international emis-
sion trading, the Clean Development Mechanism
and Joint Implementation – that are intended to
achieve these commitments in a cost-effective man-
ner.16 However, the Kyoto Protocol is rather incom-
plete regarding the details required for its imple-
mentation. It took another four years until Parties
agreed at COP 7 in Marrakesh on a detailed ‘rule
book’ to the Kyoto Protocol. The Marrakesh Accords
comprise more than 200 pages including, among
others, rules and guidelines for making the Kyoto
mechanisms operational, the accounting of emis-
sions as well as of removals of greenhouse gases
from the atmosphere resulting from land-use change
and forestry activities, and additional requirements
for greenhouse gas inventories. They also comprise
14 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries:
approaches to stimulate action, Submissions from Parties,
FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, 11 November 2005.
15 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries:
approaches to stimulate action, Draft conclusions proposed by
the President, FCCC/CP/2005/L.2, 6 December 2005.
16 For an account of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol and an analysis of its content, see Oberthür/Ott,
The Kyoto Protocol, International Climate Policy for the 21st
Century, Berlin 1999.
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decisions supporting developing countries through
capacity building, technology transfer, and the
establishment of three new funds that mainly serve
to assist developing countries to adapt to the im-
pacts of climate change: the Least Developed Coun-
tries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate Change
Fund (SCCF), and the Adaptation Fund (AF).17
However, since only the meeting of the Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol (MOP) is legally competent to
adopt Kyoto-related decisions, COP 7 formally
adopted only draft decisions and forwarded these to
the MOP for final adoption. On 30 November 2005,
the third day of the Montreal conference, it took
only a few minutes for the MOP to unanimously
adopt the 21 decisions that had been forwarded
from the COP, thereby moving a major step forward
towards the achievement of Dion’s first ‘I’.18 Only
the decision on the compliance regime was post-
poned due to a proposal by Saudi Arabia that it
should be implemented as an amendment to the
Protocol rather than by a MOP decision. 
2. Compliance regime: facilitation and
enforcement 
The compliance procedure was part of the package
negotiated in Marrakesh and although it was
finalised regarding the substance, it could not be
adopted due to different views regarding the legal
form of the agreement. These differences quickly
resurfaced in Montreal: Whereas Saudi Arabia had
tabled a proposal to adopt the procedure as an
amendment to the Protocol,19 Japan was strictly
opposed to this idea and favoured the adoption of
the compliance procedure by way of a simple deci-
sion of the MOP. The difference of these two
approaches is explained by looking at the ‘compli-
ance regime’ provisions in Article 18 of the Kyoto
Protocol, which states in its first sentence that the
MOP should at its first session ‘approve appropriate
and effective procedures’ and determines in its sec-
ond sentence that ‘any procedures and mechanisms
entailing „binding consequences“ shall be adopted
by means of an amendment to this Protocol’. 
There has been some discussion in the literature
on the meaning of ‘binding’ and the legal nature of
decisions versus amendments.20 Suffice it to say
that the degree of ‘bindingness’ depends in large
part on the value given to a procedure by the Parties
themselves. The Non-compliance Procedure of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (1987),21 for example, was adopted by
way of a decision and can deliver rulings that are
binding on the countries concerned. Since the
Parties are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’, they are in the
position to enforce the consequences whatever
legal character is given to the process.22
When Saudi Arabia proposed the adoption by
way of an amendment, therefore, it proposed (on
the surface) a ‘tougher’ procedure that would clari-
fy its character. This clarity would come with a
downside, though. According to Article 20 of the
Kyoto Protocol, amendments shall be adopted by
the MOP and afterwards have to be ratified by three
fourths of the Parties to come into force. This takes
time, and adopting the compliance procedure only
by way of an amendment would thus leave the
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17 For an analysis see Ott, ‘Global Climate’, 12 Yearbook of Inter-
national Environmental Law 2001, pp. 211-221;
Yamin/Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime, A
Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures, Cambridge 2004.
18 Compendium of draft decisions forwarded for adoption by the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol at its first session, Note by the secretariat,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3, 1 August 2005; Compendium of draft
decisions forwarded for adoption by the Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at
its first session, Note by the secretariat, Addendum, Decisions
concerning land use, land-use change and forestry, and matters
relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3/Add.1, 1 August 2005; Compendium of
draft decisions forwarded for adoption by the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
at its first session, Note by the secretariat, Addendum, Decisions
concerning guidelines under Articles 5, 7 and 9 of the Kyoto
Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3/Add.2, 1 August 2005; Com-
pendium of draft decisions forwarded for adoption by the Con-
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol at its first session, Note by the secretariat,
Addendum, Decisions concerning mechanisms pursuant to Arti-
cles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, and modalities for the
accounting of assigned amounts under Article 7, paragraph 4, 
of the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3/Add.3, 3 August
2005; Compendium of draft decisions forwarded for adoption
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its first session, Note by the
secretariat, Addendum, Decisions concerning the modalities
and procedures for a clean development mechanism, as defined
in Articles 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/3/Add.4, 3 August 2005.
19 Proposal by Saudi Arabia to amend the Kyoto Protocol, Note by
the Secretariat, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/2, 26 May 2005.
20 See MacFaul, Adoption of procedures and mechanisms relating
to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol: a guide, Vertic Brief
No. 6, November 2005.
21 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
26 ILM 1550 (1987).
22 See Ott, Umweltregime im Völkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung über
neue Formen internationaler institutionalisierter Kooperation 
am Beispiel der Verträge zum Schutz der Ozonschicht und zur
Kontrolle grenzüberschreitender Abfallverbringungen, Baden-
Baden 1998. 
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Parties without an enforcement mechanism for
some years. Second, the amendment would only be
binding for those Parties that have ratified it. Pro-
ceeding along this path would thus lead to two sets
of countries – those subject to a compliance proce-
dure and those that are not.
The European Union and the developing coun-
tries apart from Saudi Arabia favoured intermedi-
ate positions that involved adopting the compliance
procedure by way of a decision first and at the same
time initiating a process for the amendment of the
Kyoto Protocol according to its Article 18. The
extreme positions of Saudi Arabia and Japan (that
opposed the adoption of an amendment in princi-
ple) were finally overcome by a compromise for-
mulation of Canada and New Zealand. The final
wording thus stipulates that the MOP ‘approves
and adopts’ the compliance procedure and that the
‘consideration of the issue of an amendment’ shall
be ‘commenced’, with a view to ‘making a decision’
at MOP 3.23 This phrase is sufficiently vague to
allow finalising the process without prejudice to
the outcome – whether to amend the Protocol or
not. And it ensures that there is a compliance pro-
cedure in place for all Parties from the beginning of
the first commitment period.
The annex to the final decision contains the
main operational elements of a procedure that has
the potential to be an effective instrument for 
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The de-
cision establishes a Compliance Committee with
two branches: a ‘facilitative branch’ will support a
party’s efforts to comply with its obligations and an
‘enforcement branch’ has been set up to monitor
compliance with the most important obligations.
The facilitative branch, as the name indicates, is
not tasked to enforce compliance but shall support
Parties in the fulfilment of their obligations by pro-
viding advice and technical or financial assistance.
The enforcement branch, on the other hand, has
some measures at hand for bringing about compli-
ance, like prohibiting a Party from selling under the
emissions trading regime.
Additionally, for every tonne of emissions by
which a Party exceeds its target, 1.3 tonnes will be
deducted from its assigned amount for the subse-
quent commitment period. Finally, the Party not
being in compliance will be required to submit a
‘compliance action plan’ that will be reviewed by
the committee. An appeals procedure provides for a
review of decisions by the MOP. During the appeals
procedure the decisions by the Compliance Com-
mittee remain in force – an important detail that
strengthens the position of the Committee. Over-
turning a decision of the Compliance Committee by
the MOP and referring the matter back to the
Enforcement Branch requires a three-fourths ma-
jority. It remains to be seen how the procedure will
operate in practice, but it certainly lays a good foun-
dation for the effective enforcement of the Protocol
obligations.
3. Joint Implementation
According to Article 6 of the Protocol, Annex I
Parties can acquire emission reduction units (ERUs)
generated by greenhouse gas mitigation projects in
other Annex I Parties and count these towards their
Kyoto targets. Countries which meet all the criteria
for participating in the Protocol’s flexible mecha-
nisms qualify for the JI 1st track, which does not
require an approval process as complex as under
the JI 2nd track. The 1st track therefore was not an
issue in Montreal. 
Projects in the 2nd track are to be conducted
under an international procedure overseen by the JI
Supervisory Committee (JISC). Much of the discus-
sion in Montreal focussed on whether to utilise ele-
ments from the CDM process in the JI procedures.
Annex I Parties wanted to see much of the CDM
rules applied to JI to facilitate the functioning of the
latter mechanism. Non-Annex I Parties, however,
were concerned that climate-friendly investment
will flow into JI projects rather than CDM projects.
The compromise reached in Montreal included the
decision that Designated Operational Entities under
the CDM (private certification companies that audit
whether projects meet the CDM requirements) will
not automatically qualify for evaluating JI 2nd
track projects but have to instead apply for accredi-
tation. However, they can serve provisionally until
the JISC has taken the accreditation decision. Fur-
thermore, the CDM Project Design Document and
the methodologies for measuring a project’s climate
benefit approved under the CDM can be utilised.24
23 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Procedures and mechanisms relating to
compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP//CMP/2005/L.5,
7 December 2005.
24 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto
Protocol, FCCC/KP//CMP/2005/L.5, 7 December 2005.
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The decisions taken in Montreal will help speed up
the process of establishing JI 2nd track projects
especially if the funds pledged to support the work
of the JISC will come forward as indicated.
4. Funding for developing countries 
Two of the three financial mechanisms originating
from the Marrakesh Accords still remained to be
operationalised in Montreal: the Adaptation Fund
(AF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).
The former aims at supporting vulnerable develop-
ing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate
change, whereas the latter addresses both mitiga-
tion and adaptation activities in developing coun-
tries. How these funds are intended to function was
discussed during two separate agenda items as the
SCCF relates to the Convention whereas issues re-
garding the AF relate to the Protocol. Once in oper-
ation, the funds could indeed drive activities of
adaptation and possibly economic diversification 
in non-Annex I Parties: financial support of USD 
34 million has been pledged by Annex I Parties to
the SCCF, and the AF receives a share of proceeds
of 2% of the CERs generated under the CDM as
well as voluntary contributions.
However, achieving agreement in these areas
proved to be difficult because the disagreement
over the funds is intimately linked to concerns
regarding the operation of the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), the entity charged with operating the
climate regime’s financial mechanism. The SCCF,
just like its Convention sister fund, the Least
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), is located in the
GEF. Some developing countries feel that the GEF
requirement for co-financing is favouring countries
that already receive the bulk of foreign direct
investment flowing to the global South. The recent
development at the GEF, to adopt a Resource Al-
location Framework that earmarks funds to certain
countries, has thus been met with great resistance
by some developing countries. A communication
document between the COP and the GEF has been
agreed on that requests the GEF to clarify these
issues. A recent report by the GEF was taken note of
under the COP and views were invited to develop
additional guidance to the GEF on the SCCF.
The SCCF was therefore not fully operationalised
in Montreal. Despite considerable progress on the
draft text regarding the functioning of the SCCF,
Parties did not come to an agreement over the role
of ‘economic diversification activities’ in the fund, a
recurrent demand by OPEC countries that aim to be
compensated for alleged losses of oil revenues due
to climate protection policies. As a result, the brack-
eted text of the last meeting of the subsidiary bod-
ies of the climate regime in May 2005 (SB 22) ended
up being passed on to the next meeting (SB 24)
without any changes.
Concerns regarding the AF are even more com-
plex. According to developing country Parties, the
substantial political power that the US can exercise
in the decision-making processes at the GEF may
make it inappropriate for managing a fund that is
driven by the Kyoto Protocol, which the US has not
ratified. Nevertheless, the EU supported the loca-
tion of the fund in the GEF to ensure that project
activities are coordinated with the activities under
both the SCCF and the LDCF. In addition, the EU
favoured the co-financing instrument that is gener-
ally applied by the GEF. At the end of lengthy for-
mal and informal discussions, an agreed text was
forwarded to the MOP laying out initial guidance
that specified neither the location of the fund nor
the procedural issues such as co-financing, cost-
effectiveness and eligibility criteria but called for
submissions of Parties on this matter and a work-
shop coordinated by the Secretariat.25 Related to
the AF is a completely bracketed draft Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) between the MOP
and the GEF that has been passed on to SB 24. The
EU and Japan had called for this MoU, but G-77 &
China found it unnecessary since the group does
not want the AF located in the GEF. These two
financial mechanisms will thus continue to be
under heated debate. 
5. Starting the Buenos Aires Work
Programme on Adaptation
Adaptation is a cross-cutting issue across all sec-
tions of the Convention. COP 9 in Milan 2003 thus
had set up a comprehensive approach dealing with
adaptation concerns. From these efforts emerged
the Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adapta-
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with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Conven-
tion, for the operation of the Adaptation Fund,
FCCC/SBI/2005/L.32, 6 December 2005.
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tion and Response Measures, adopted at COP 10,
which called for the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to develop a
five-year programme of work on scientific, techni-
cal and socio-economic aspects of vulnerability and
adaptation to climate change. Parties have since
submitted their views and a three-day workshop
was held in Bonn in October 2005 to provide guid-
ance to COP 11. 
The objective of the programme of work as
adopted at COP 11 is to ‘assist all Parties, in partic-
ular developing countries, to improve their under-
standing and assessment of impacts, vulnerability
and adaptation, and to make informed decisions on
practical adaptation actions and measures’.26 The
programme’s scope contains two thematic areas:
impacts and vulnerability; adaptation planning,
measures and actions, and two crosscutting issues:
methodologies, data and modelling; integration
into sustainable development. The programme also
covers promoting understanding and the develop-
ment and dissemination of measures, methodolo-
gies and tools for economic diversification aimed at
increasing economic resilience and reducing re-
liance on vulnerable economic sectors. 
To achieve the aims of the programme, SBSTA
had elaborated a seven-page draft indicative list of
activities for information gathering, analysis and
dissemination.27 SBSTA 24 (May 2006 in Bonn) is
to further elaborate on this list, decide on the tim-
ing and the possible role of experts in the imple-
mentation. Subsequent SBSTAs are to develop
guidance for future actions based on the results 
of the initial activities. SBSTA 28 (2008) is to estab-
lish the timing and modalities for these further
actions. At COP 16 (2010) a review and report is to
be submitted. 
IV. Improvement – reforming the CDM 
Arguably the key element on Dion’s ‘Improvement’
agenda was the CDM, which allows industrialised
countries to acquire CERs generated by climate pro-
tection projects in developing countries and count
these towards their Kyoto targets. In contrast to JI,
the Marrakesh Accords had mandated a ‘prompt
start’ for the CDM and the first project had already
been registered on 28 November 2004. However,
there have been an increasing number of voices in
the international climate policy arena calling for
improvements to the way the mechanism func-
tions. On the one hand, critics complain that the
process leading to the registration of a project and
the issuance of CERs has become too complex and
costly. Furthermore, there have been complaints
that projects are concentrating in a few countries
only and that the project types that are most likely
to contribute to host countries’ sustainable develop-
ment, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency
and transport projects, are not competitive in the
CDM market and therefore in danger of becoming
marginalised.28
These concerns were already raised in Buenos
Aires last year, but were voiced in Montreal with
enhanced urgency. Twenty-seven items were tabled
during the negotiations and diplomats worked long
hours to find compromises between investor and
host country Parties. Following are the key deci-
sions taken in Montreal. 
Right from its inception, the CDM Executive
Board (CDM EB) was insufficiently funded to carry
out its work. The sponsoring of the CDM process
had been promised but had not materialised. In
Montreal, Parties pledged to henceforward deliver
the funds needed until the CDM may become self-
financing through the share of proceeds for admin-
istrative expenses that is to be levied from CDM
projects. MOP 1 also set the level for the share of
proceeds: the first 15,000 CERs per year that a proj-
ect yields will be charged an administrative fee of
0.10 USD each whereas each CER after that will be
charged a fee of 0.20 USD.29
The ‘additionality requirement’ in the CDM came
once again under fire at the negotiations. Ad-
ditionality demands that a project activity’s emis-
sions have to be lower than those than those that
would have occurred in the absence of the project
activity. The Executive Board has developed the vol-
untary ‘Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment
26 Draft Decision -/CP.11, Five-year programme of work of the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change,
FCCC/CP/2005/L.3, 9 December 2005.
27 Scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of impacts,
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, Draft conclu-
sions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2005/L.30, 7 Decem-
ber 2005.
28 For a discussion of these concerns and reform proposals see, for
example, Michaelowa, CDM: current status and possibilities for
reform, Hamburg 2005.
29 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Further guidance relating to the clean
development mechanism, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/L.7, 
8 December 2005.
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of Additionality’ to clarify the requirements. How-
ever, the process of establishing whether a project is
additional has been criticised by the International
Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and some
developing countries as being too strict and com-
plex. The proposals made in Montreal ranged from
affirming the status quo to preparing a decision for
MOP 2 that would overrule the CDM EB procedure
on additionality. The compromise reached was to
leave the authority on additionality with the CDM
EB, but to make a call for public input on new pro-
posals to demonstrate additionality and report the
outcome to MOP 2.30
Concerns were also raised over the geographic
distribution of participation in CDM projects not-
ing that particular countries, especially in Africa,
are in danger of being left empty-handed. As a
response to these criticisms, the MOP resolved to
invite Parties’ submissions on what systemic and
systematic factors may constitute barriers to a more
equitable geographical distribution of projects. The
CDM EB is to prepare recommendations for MOP 2
on this basis.31 Furthermore, Annex I Parties were
invited to increase their capacity-building activities
with a view to achieving a more equitable global
distribution.32
Another topic that was intensively debated was
that of the newly emerging Sectoral CDM. Under a
Sectoral CDM, policies and programmes may be-
come CDM projects alongside the current single-
site projects.33 During the negotiations it emerged
that non-Annex I countries see the Sectoral CDM as
a way to broaden the scale of the CDM whereas
Annex I countries were hesitant to embrace the
idea based on their concerns of the CDM being
watered down. During the MOP, countries decided
to exclude ‘policies’ and ‘standards’ from the CDM
but to include ‘programmes’ that use appropriate
methodologies to ensure that emission reductions
are ‘real, measurable, verifiable and additional’.
However, the negotiators did not agree on a defini-
tion of the term ‘programme’. Furthermore, coun-
tries agreed to allow the bundling of several large-
scale activities at multiple sites into one project.34
In response to the request for clarification
brought forth by the CDM EB, the MOP needed to
deal with the role of HFC projects in the CDM. HFC-
projects reduce Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC). The
incineration of HFC-23 is a popular CDM-project
activity as the emission reductions can be achieved
quite cheaply. HFC-23 incineration at existing pro-
duction sites can already generate CDM credits, but
the CDM EB wanted clarity on whether incinera-
tion at new facilities was also permitted under the
CDM. In Montreal, Parties were only able to agree
on a definition of a ‘new facility’. The issue of how
to deal with them was referred to the next session
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technolo-
gical Advice (SBSTA) to work out recommenda-
tions for MOP 2. Concerning the issue of whether
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology can
be applied in a CDM project, the MOP asked the
UNFCCC secretariat to organise a workshop on this
issue with the aim of having the CDM EB prepare
recommendations on how to approve CCS projects
as CDM projects by MOP 2.35
Affirming the future of the CDM beyond the
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, which
ends in 2012, was of broad concern at the confer-
ence. This did not depend on the CDM negotiators,
though, but rather on whether it would be possible
to establish a solid negotiation process for the time
after 2012. The decisions finally taken in this re-
gard, analysed above, exceeded expectations and
reaffirm that the Kyoto Protocol is here to stay and
to be continued after 2012. Thus, this decision also
serves to bolster confidence that emission reduc-
tions post-2012 will have value – even though it is
not the explicit guarantee some had hoped for. 
Besides being the first of its kind, MOP 1 has
made considerable headway towards making the
Kyoto mechanisms operational. The adoption of the
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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Capacity-building relating to the imple-
mentation of the Kyoto Protocol in developing countries,
FCCC/SBI/2005/L.35, 6 December 2005.
33 See, for example, Samaniego/Figueres, ‘Evolving to a Sector-
Based Clean Development Mechanism’, in: Baumert (ed.), Buil-
ding on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate.
Washington, DC 2002, pp. 89-108; Figueres, Sectoral CDM:
Opening the CDM to the yet Unrealized Goal of Sustainable
Development, Forthcoming publication of the International
Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 2005.
Sterk/Wittneben, Addressing Opportunities and Challenges of a
Sectoral Approach to the Clean Development Mechanism, Wup-
pertal 2005.
34 Draft decision -/CMP.1, Further guidance relating to the clean
development mechanism, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/L.7, 8 December
2005.
35 Decision -/CMP.1, Implications of the establishment of new
hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22 (HCFC-22) facilities seeking to
obtain certified emission reductions for the destruction of hydro-
fluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23), FCCC/SBSTA/2005/L.27/Add.1, 6
December 2005.
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Marrakech Accords by the MOP brings more cer-
tainty to the Kyoto process. With the JISC being set
up and ready to operate, North-North cooperation
on climate-friendly projects can now begin. Increas-
ing the CDM EB staff and providing the necessary
funding for the CDM process will accelerate the
approval process and eliminate the current backlog
of projects. 
To ensure the integrity of the CDM, the MOP
resisted calls to undermine the additionality re-
quirement. The MOP also launched a process to
examine the reasons for the current inequitable
geographical distribution of CDM projects and
develop options to address this problem. Further-
more, the decision to include programmes in the
CDM may serve to enhance the sustainable devel-
opment benefits by supporting sustainable energy
activities such as renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency. Nevertheless, there is still ways to go in
order to advance the sustainable development ob-
jective of the CDM. High-quality projects continue
to be in need of encouragement, as the trend seems
to be heading towards including CCS projects and
HFC-23 incineration at new facilities. These proj-
ects are capable of reducing emissions but their
contribution to local sustainability goals remains
controversial. Thus the onus of bringing about 
sustainable development continues to be on host 
countries to only approve high-quality projects and
on buyer countries to demand CERs from sustain-
able projects. 
V. Conclusions and outlook
Only history will award the climate negotiations 
in Montreal their proper place. Nevertheless, the
following observation appears to be justified: The
Kyoto Protocol is by no means in a safe haven,
but it is certainly in from the cold. The treaty is in
force, its mechanisms have rules and its institutions
are staffed with experienced diplomats. The fur-
ther development of the Protocol is not any longer
dependent on one particular country, but open to 
a range of processes by various groups of coun-
tries. In short – the Kyoto Protocol is alive and rela-
tively healthy.
All three ‘Is’ remain important: Implementation,
because without effective policies at the national,
regional and local level the Protocol would still fail.
Only when emissions actually decrease will the cap-
and-trade approach of the Kyoto Protocol finally
prove its worth. This means that all Annex I Parties
have to get down to serious business now and start
implementing effective climate policies.36 A re-
porting procedure for such domestic activities is in
place, as well as a compliance procedure to support
implementation and to deter from non-compliance.
‘Improvement’ will also remain important. The
Kyoto Protocol Parties have the necessary means at
hand to continuously adapt the rules of the regime
to new insights, developments and circumstances.
The operation of the flexible mechanisms, for
example, represents a steep learning curve for all
Parties and requires constant modifications of the
regime. However, the procedures for such learning
processes might need to be improved. One of the
most severe obstacles for faster amendments of the
rules is the consensus requirement that is in place
because Parties have so far not been able to agree
on rules for voting.
And last, the ‘Innovation’ process will require
substantial input in terms of time, energy, money
and creativity.37 The latter should arguably play the
most prominent role. Michael Zammit Cutajar, the
intellectual father of the three ‘Is’, had originally
termed the third process ‘Imagination’, instead of
‘Innovation’. This expression may have expressed
even better the difficult tasks ahead, because it cap-
tures the essence of what is required: The ability to
think beyond traditional concepts of power politics
and beyond positions dictated by short-term nation-
al interests. 
This is true for Annex I and non-Annex I coun-
tries. Whereas the former will have to accept that
substantial financial support for developing coun-
tries will be required in order to induce effective cli-
mate policies in the South, the latter will have to
say good-bye to outdated concepts of ‘solidarity’
within the G-77 & China – meaning that they must
all be treated alike. There are substantial differ-
36 See e.g. the report of the Wuppertal Institute for WWF, Target
2020: Policies and Measures to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions in the EU, available at:
http://www.panda.org/climate/EUtarget2020.
37 See http://www.fiacc.net and the various approaches described
by Bodansky, Climate Commitments, Assessing the Options.
Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change, Pew
Climate Center, 2005. See also Höhne/Phylipsen/Ullrich/Blok,
Options for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Proto-
col, research report for the German Federal Environmental
Agency, 2005, available at: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de.
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ences between G-77 countries. But there are also
ways of addressing those differences in a transpar-
ent and equitable manner.38
The Montreal conference initiated a number of
post-2012 processes with the aim of addressing the
climate challenge more adequately. Within the
Kyoto track, negotiations on a second commitment
period for industrialised countries were initiated
and preparations for the Article 9 review of the
Kyoto Protocol are underway. The latter could
potentially lead to an evolution of the Protocol that
enables some non-Annex I Parties to take on (other
types of) commitments in the mid-term. This will
also be an objective of the Convention track, the
‘dialogue on long-term cooperative action’. One of
the main challenges will be to conduct those nego-
tiations separately from each other, but neverthe-
less to ensure that they may eventually converge.
One of the most delicate tasks of the years ahead
will be to find a strategy to deal with the United
States, which is engaged in the convention process
but not in the Kyoto regime. It was quite visible in
Montreal that the US administration had never
been as isolated in the climate negotiations. Saudi
Arabia in the end remained the only ally. Last
minute high-level attempts by President Bush to
forge a ‘coalition of the unwilling’ were not suc-
cessful. But the US administration was not only iso-
lated at the international level. The multitude of
people and organisations from the US roaming the
premises of the conference provided the distinct
feeling that the Bush administration was even iso-
lated within its own country. The close distance 
to US territory allowed a much wider participation
of US Americans than usual. Dozens of mayors
from all over the US, hundreds of environmental
organisations, green business associations, religious
groups and also the Inuit from the Arctic all de-
manded that the US support effective climate poli-
cy and not obstruct progress of the Kyoto Protocol.
Many went as far as calling on the rest of the world
to go ahead without paying too much attention to
the current US administration. 
This image of desperate – rather than splendid –
isolation may have encouraged European, African,
Asian and Latin American diplomats to show more
courage than usual. The US delegation in the end
had to budge because their position simply had
become untenable. Although there is little reason to
believe that the current US administration will
change its attitude towards climate policy in gener-
al and the Kyoto Protocol in particular, future
Presidents of whatever colour may have a very dif-
ferent attitude – and there is increasing climate
change activity on Capitol Hill. It can safely be
expected that the cap-and-trade approach of the
Kyoto Protocol, largely conceived of by scientists
and policy-makers from the United States, will also
be the favourite model for international climate
policy by a future US administration. 
The next meetings, MOP 2 and COP 12, will take
place from 6 to 17 November 2006 in Nairobi,
Kenya. A climate conference in a sub-Saharan Afri-
can country constitutes a remarkable progress of
the regime. It could place developing countries’ con-
cerns firmly on the agenda – both in terms of miti-
gating climate change and of adapting to climate
change. This could certainly be a promising start
for post-2012 negotiations.
The Montreal Climate Summit100
38 See e.g. Ott/Winkler/Brouns/Kartha/Mace/Huq/Kameyama/Sari/
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North Dialogue on Equity in the Greenhouse, A proposal for an
adequate and equitable global climate agreement, Eschborn
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